Labels certify that a product meets some standard for quality, but often consumers are unsure of the exact standard that the label represents. Focusing on the case of eco-labels for environmental quality, we show how even small amounts of uncertainty can create consumer confusion that reduces or eliminates the value to …rms of adopting voluntary labels. First, consumers are most suspicious of the standard for a label when a product with a bad reputation has it, so labels are often unpersuasive at showing that a seemingly bad product is actually good. Second, label proliferation multiplies the e¤ect of uncertainty, causing the informativeness of labels to decrease rather than increase. Third, uncertainty makes labeling and non-labeling equilibria more likely to coexist as the number of labels increases, so consumers face greater strategic uncertainty over how to interpret the presence or absence of a label. Finally, a label can be either legitimitized or spoiled for use by other products when a product with a good or bad reputation displays it, so …rms have an incentive to adopt labels strategically to manipulate such information spillovers, which further exacerbates label confusion. Managers can reduce label confusion by supporting mandatory labeling or by undertaking investments to make certain labels "focal". JEL Classi…cation Categories: L15, L21, D82
Introduction
When product quality is unobservable, quality labels are an important mechanism for …rms to prove their quality to consumers. However, consumers are often unsure of the exact quality standard that a label represents -is it a relatively easy or di¢ cult standard? This is particularly important for "eco-labels"for certifying environmental quality since environmental impact is often a credence good that consumers cannot directly observe and since there has been a proliferation of numerous di¤erent labels for …rms to choose from. 1 Despite attempts by governments, industry groups, and NGOs to clarify label standards, confusion by consumers is widely blamed for undermining the credibility of eco-labels, thereby reducing the incentive for their adoption by …rms. 2 We examine this issue of how consumer uncertainty about label standards a¤ects the managerial decision to certify a product of given environmental quality with an eco-label. When label standards are uncertain, consumers face a joint estimation problem. If they see a label on a product they must estimate whether the label is more indicative of a high quality product, or of an undemanding standard for the label. For instance, when a car buyer sees a Low Emission Vehicle label, she will update both her estimate of the car's environmental quality and of the meaning of the Low Emission Vehicle label. If the car is a large SUV then the updating on both dimensions is likely to be very di¤erent than if the car is a small hybrid. Just as an employer must jointly estimate the ability of a job applicant and the value of his degree, or a tourist must jointly estimate the quality of a hotel and the toughness of the local rating system, a consumer cannot rely on the mere presence of an eco-label to determine a product's environmental quality.
We investigate how this joint estimation problem a¤ects the power of labels to reduce information asymmetries about product quality. We …nd that concern over the e¤ects of uncertain labeling standards is well founded. In addition to the direct information loss due to the uncertainty, the optimal responses of consumers and …rms lead to further information losses that can greatly undermine the value of voluntary labeling. First, labeling is most valuable when consumers think that a product is likely to be bad but in fact it is certi…ably good. But when standards are uncertain, if a product is expected to be low quality then there is a "Groucho e¤ect" in which consumers infer that the labeling standard is probably weak if such a product can meet it. Just as Groucho Marx famously joked that he did not want to join a club with standards so low as to accept him as a member, a …rm with a bad reputation gains little from labeling. Therefore the incentive for labeling is undermined when the problem of information asymmetry, and hence the potential gain from labeling, is greatest. 1 Ecolabelling.org lists over 300 eco-labels in use. Many of these apply to multiple product categories and use varying standards for the categories, e.g., only 11% of light …xtures are eligible for the U.S. EnergyStar Label for energy saving while 89% of televisions are eligible for the same label (Washington Post, February 22, 2010) . 2 As a report prepared for the World Bank noted, "The diversity of ecolabels (which re ‡ect the multitude of certi…cation schemes) can be confusing to consumers and weaken the credibility of all labels," (Fischer et al., 2005) . See also "What do labels really tell you? As eco-labels proliferate, so do doubts," Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2009. The impact of label confusion on adoption incentives is seen for the E.U. Flower label where no products by major manufactures have been certi…ed for some product categories (see European Eco-label Catalogue at www.eco-label.com) and surveys indicate that understanding of the label is far lower than of other regional and national eco-labels (Sto and Strandbakken, 2005) .
Second, the presence of multiple labels with di¤erent standards should create more opportunity for …rms of di¤erent quality levels to certify themselves and thereby reduce information asymmetries. But when standards are uncertain, the proliferation of labels has the opposite impact. Since consumers do not know which standards are easy and which are di¢ cult, a label only proves that a …rm has met the easiest of the di¤erent standards, even if the …rm has met a higher standard. This both reduces the informativeness of labeling and also reduces the incentive to be certi…ed. As the number of di¤erent standards rises, we …nd that the informativeness of labeling goes to zero and that a "non-labeling" equilibrium always exists for a su¢ ciently high number of standards.
Third, uncertain standards aggravate the problem of strategic uncertainty due to the coexistence of labeling and non-labeling equilibria. Multiple equilibria can arise with voluntary labeling because if consumers expect a …rm to have a label then lack of one is particularly damaging to the …rm's estimated quality, but if labeling is not expected then the …rm loses less from not having a label and can save on certi…cation costs. When standards are known, this multiplicity of equilibria disappears under a regularity condition as the number of standards increases. But with uncertain standards we …nd instead that the multiple equilibrium problem is aggravated by more labels and that labeling and non-labeling equilibria always coexist for a su¢ ciently large number of labels unless certi…cation costs are so high that only non-labeling is an equilibrium.
Finally, we …nd that uncertainty over standards generates information externalities between …rms that can lead to strategic behavior that further reduces the informativeness of labels. A …rm can "legitimize"or "spoil"a label for use by other …rms depending on whether the …rm has a good or bad reputation. Consequently disreputable …rms have an incentive to adopt the same label as reputable …rms, while reputable …rms instead have an incentive to avoid labels adopted by disreputable …rms. Such managerial strategizing makes it di¢ cult for consumers to rely on the existing reputations of …rms as a simple way to learn about di¤erent standards, and gives certi…ers an incentive to promote early adoption among …rms of recognized high quality. 3 A key factor in consumer uncertainty over labeling standards is that the source of a label or certi…cate is often unclear. For instance, the similar-appearing "FSC" and "SFI" labels are two of the main eco-labels for forest products, but one is controlled by an environmental NGO and the other by an industry-backed NGO. The potential for such confusion is widespread -of the 363 di¤erent labeling schemes tracked by ecolabelling.org, 209 are run by NGOs, 59 are run by industry groups, 53 are run by governments, and 42 are run by for-pro…t …rms. Moreover, even when the source of a label is clear, the objectives of certi…ers, and hence the likely di¢ culty of their standards, are often unclear. 4 To capture these uncertainties, we model consumers as having a prior distribution of the labeling standard(s) that can be arbitrarily precise or di¤use, and arbitrarily skewed toward higher or lower 3 An E.U. report on the di¢ culty of getting the E.U. Flower Label established in the laundry detergent market states, "Moreover, a real break-through calls for one or more of the multinationals to apply for the eco-label on their main products... it will probably have a snowball e¤ect on the market." (Madsen et al., 2002) . 4 Shaked and Sutton (1981) discuss the varying objectives of industry groups, and Maxwell (2010) discusses the unclear objectives of NGOs.
levels. For instance, consumers might believe that an eco-label standard is likely to be easy or di¢ cult, but be unsure of exactly how easy or di¢ cult, or they might be completely uncertain of the di¢ culty. This distinguishes our approach from most of the literature in which the labeling standards are assumed to be common knowledge. Our model is most appropriate for consumer product markets where buyers are unlikely to be well-informed, rather than for markets for raw materials or intermediary products where buyers have strong incentives to acquire exact information on the source and meaning of di¤erent standards. Since label confusion reduces the value of labeling as a strategy to inform consumers about product quality, …rms with high environmental quality might want to take various managerial actions to reduce label confusion. Most directly, investments in clarifying label standards can enhance both the informativeness and likelihood of labeling, thereby allowing consumers to make more informed decisions. 5 Industry groups, governments, for-pro…t labelers, or NGOs interested in promoting label adoption can also try to make a particular standard "focal"in the sense of publicizing it and making consumers expect that …rms will adopt the standard if they meet it. This can reduce or eliminate the information losses caused by label proliferation and by strategic uncertainty over which equilibria are being played by …rms. For instance, "look for the label"campaigns can be interpreted as encouraging consumers to focus on particular labels among the multiplicity of possible labels. Government and industry attempts to reduce the number of labels or "harmonize"or standardize di¤erent voluntary standards also have this e¤ect. 6 These results on label confusion add to the literature on veri…able message "persuasion" or "disclosure" games (see the survey by Dranove and Jin, 2010), 7 and in particular to the debate on mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure. The classic "unravelling"result …nds that mandatory disclosure is unnecessary since even those with bad information have an incentive to prove they do not have worse information. 8 However, as recognized early on, voluntary disclosure might be insu¢ cient if 5 Additional gains can arise from a quality response to labels as found by Jin and Leslie (2003) , but we take quality as exogenous in our model and focus on the certi…cation decision. Lerner and Tirole (2006) allow …rms to adjust their quality in response to standards. 6 In response to Canadian regulations enforcing a single de…nition for "organic", a spokesperson for the Organic Trade Association stated: "It's a consumer's dream. When they see an organic claim out in the marketplace, it has a very strict de…nition, the government is behind it, and everybody is meeting the same standards." (Montreal Gazette, February 17, 2009 ). More generally, the EU has been attempting to harmonize eco-labels across countries in the "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Community Ecolabel Scheme," SEC(2008) 2118 and SEC(2008) 2119. Regarding private e¤orts, the ISEAL Alliance of certi…ers has tried to make standards for eco-labels more transparent in order to reduce consumer confusion (http://isealalliance.org). Of course, not all …rms prefer harmonization and transparency. Firms who cannot meet labeling standards or who prefer not to pay the costs can potentially bene…t from more label confusion due to label proliferation. 7 The restriction of messages to certain types, e.g., a …rm cannot show a label it is not quali…ed for, distinguishes this literature from cheap talk games. Communication is still possible through pure cheap talk if there are multiple dimensions of quality (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010) , but in this paper we follow the standard assumption of a single dimension. 8 Mandatory disclosure is distinct from the imposition of minimum quality standards that can exclude …rms from the market (Leland, 1979) . The application to environmental quality standards is considered by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell (2000) , and the application to eco-labeling is analyzed by Amacher, Koskela, and Ollikainen (2004) and Mattoo and Singh (1994) . disclosure is costly (Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983) . Our analysis contributes to this debate by showing that the combination of costly disclosure and uncertainty is particularly disruptive to voluntary disclosure, and that the e¤ects are exacerbated when there are multiple labels.
The idea that the imperfect nature of labels can have an important e¤ect on disclosure strategies appears in other papers that di¤er from ours in other key respects. Sinclair-Desgagne and Gozlan (2003) consider binary tests of environmental quality that are known by consumers to vary in accuracy and allow …rms to choose whether to take the more accurate or less accurate test. Lerner and Tirole (2006) and Farhi, Lerner, and Tirole (2008) consider standards that are known to be of di¤ering di¢ culty and assume the …rm is uncertain of its own quality, so that from the …rm's perspective there is uncertainty over whether a particular standard will turn out to be too di¢ cult. These papers focus on how …rms can best "show o¤" their quality by choosing standards that are known to be either more or less di¢ cult, and …nd that multiple standards increase the ability of …rms to provide information about their quality. But for eco-labels we believe that our assumption that consumers are unaware of the underlying standard embodied in a certi…cation label is more appropriate. Because of this di¤erence in assumptions, other papers have not addressed the main issues that we examine, including confusion due to label proliferation, legitimizing and spoiling of labels, and the role for mandatory disclosure or "focal"equilibria in reducing confusion. As discussed later, the exception is Fishman and Hagerty (1990) who consider costless disclosure of one of multiple noisy signals of "high"or "low"quality and whose results are closely related to our …ndings regarding focal equilibria.
Our analysis is for the case where labels certify that a standard has been met and provide no more detailed information. Voluntary labels typically takes this "pass-fail"form in which a certi…cate or label is awarded or not, even in cases where more detailed information could be provided. For instance, of the 10 non-government eco-labels for carbon emissions listed at the ecolabelling.org website, all but one provides a simple label of approval without more detailed information about the product's carbon footprint. The prevalence of simple labels could re ‡ect the need to reduce information processing by consumers. Or, consistent with the theoretical literature, it could re ‡ect the incentive of certi…cation intermediaries to withhold more detailed information when labeling is voluntary (Lizzeri, 1999) . Given the prevalence of the pass-fail form and the multiple reasons for it, we take the form as given in our analysis.
We discuss our results in the context of eco-labeling, but they apply to any certi…cation or labeling scheme about which uncertainty over a pass-fail standard exists. More broadly, the issues we investigate arise in any situation in which observers must jointly update their beliefs about an agent's quality and an uncertain quality standard. For instance, consistent with Groucho Marx's concerns, our analysis shows that a disreputable individual might indeed …nd little bene…t from joining a club because the very fact of his membership downgrades the perceived standards of the club.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop the basic model with one standard, de…ne the conditions for the existence of both labeling and non-labeling equilibria, show the existence of the Groucho e¤ect and analyze its impact on informativeness. In Section 3 we analyze the multistandard case, showing that the qualitative results of Section 2 continue to hold, and that the impact of the Groucho e¤ect is worsened. In Section 4 we consider strategic interactions between …rms when there are multiple standards and information spillovers. In Section 5 we present our conclusions.
Base Model
We consider a …rm's decision to have its product certi…ed that it meets a quality standard for a eco-label. The product's exogenously given (environmental) quality Q is distributed according to distribution F with full support on [0; 1] and with corresponding density function f . 9 The …rm knows the realized value q of Q, but consumers only know its distribution F . There exists a label with standard S which is distributed according to the distribution G with full support on [0; 1] and with corresponding density function g. The …rm knows the realized value s of S. If consumers also know the realized value s we say the standard is "certain" and if they only know the distribution G we say the standard is "uncertain". For simplicity we assume Q and S are independent. In this section we assume that there is only one label. If q s the …rm has a choice to obtain a label or not, i.e., a …rm that meets the labeling standard need not choose to be certi…ed for the label. If q < s the …rm does not meet the standard so it has no choice. Certi…cation has a …xed cost c > 0 that is independent of q or s 10 and captures any fees to the certi…er and any other costs, e.g., the expense of documenting quality control processes, auditing and testing costs by the certi…er, and the opportunity cost of providing space on the product packaging for the label. 11 We assume the payo¤ to the …rm is the expected quality of its product as estimated by consumers less the certi…cation cost if it chooses to certify. Since we allow for general F , all of the results hold as long as the …rm's payo¤ is a strictly increasing function of quality as estimated by consumers. Consumer concern for environmental quality could capture direct …nancial gains to the consumer, e.g., savings from lower energy use, or internalized social bene…ts, e.g., knowing that forests are protected. 9 The exogeneity assumption applies best to quality features that are not so essential to consumers that the …rm will immediately change its product in response to a label standard. While eco-labeling organizations typically hope for product changes over time, such hopes depend on the successful initial adoption of the eco-label for existing products. Our model is focused on this label adoption decision. 1 0 Since quality q is exogenous this cost is purely a certi…cation cost rather than a cost to improve the product.
We assume the certi…cation cost is also independent of the standard s but in some cases the testing component of certi…cation costs might be more expensive when the standard is tougher. This would strengthen our result that consumers are suspicious that a label represents a low standard and aggravate the negative e¤ect of standard uncertainty on labeling incentives. 1 1 The costs of certi…cation for eco-labels can be a substantial fraction of total costs (Vitalis, 2002) . The main association of small and medium businesses in the E.U. lists its primary requested revision in eco-label policy as, "An overall reduction of the costs, in particular the costs of the technical tests required in order to show the respect of the criteria." (See "UEAPME's Position on the Revision of the Eco-label Regulation," UEAPME, November, 2008). Note that we are not di¤erentiating between whether the manufacturer or retailer is paying the certi…cation costs (Guo, 2009 ).
The expected quality of a product conditional on quality Q exceeding the standard S, where the value of S is distributed according to G, is
and similarly the expected quality conditional on not meeting the standard is
When s is known these conditional expectations reduce to
. Before analyzing the equilibrium behavior of …rms, …rst consider the e¤ect of uncertainty about the standard on consumer information supposing that all …rms meeting the standard obtain a label. Because the label provides information about both Q and S, it provides less information about Q alone than when S is known. For instance, for the case of uniform F and G, the expected meansquared-error of consumer estimates of Q falls from 1=12 to 1=24 when S is certain but falls only to 1=18 when S is uncertain. As the following proposition con…rms, this pattern holds for general F and G. For particular realizations s of S, e.g., for very high or low s, certain standards can be less informative than uncertain standards, but on average a certain standard is more informative.
Proposition 1 Suppose all eligible …rms are labeled. The expected informativeness of the label is lower if the standard is uncertain than if it is certain.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Clearly, if the objective of …rms in a¢ xing a label to their product is to convey information about quality to consumers, it is desirable that consumers understand the meaning of the label. Our objective in the present paper is to explore how the equilibrium labeling decisions of …rms aggravate the uncertainty problem to create further confusion among consumers.
Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium subject to a belief-re…nement introduced below. In a labeling equilibrium a …rm whose product meets or exceeds the labeling standard always obtains a label, so the lack of a label implies failure to meet the standard. Consumer beliefs used to update product quality are consistent with this …rm strategy in equilibrium, so the equilibrium condition is simply that the bene…t from labeling is higher than the cost,
Since E[QjQ S] > E[QjQ < S] such an equilibrium exists for c su¢ ciently small and does not exist for c su¢ ciently large. In a non-labeling equilibrium a …rm does not certify product quality 1 2 If a labeling equilibrium exists a continuum of equilibria also exist where only types in some subset X [S; 1] obtain a label with the knife-edge result that
We do not analyze these equilibria in which all types are indi¤erent between labeling and non-labeling.
even if it can, so lack of a label represents no news at all, implying the prior estimate E[Q] is unchanged. Labeling in the non-labeling equilibrium is an unexpected, out of equilibrium action. We re…ne the perfect Bayesian equilibrium set by assuming that consumers believe that such an action is equally likely to have been by any type that meets the standard, so an unexpected label is good news that generates the updated estimate E[QjQ S].
13 Therefore the equilibrium condition for the non-labeling equilibrium is
Since
such an equilibrium does not exist for c su¢ ciently small and does exist for c su¢ ciently large. Comparing the two conditions, since E[QjQ < S] < E[Q] the left hand side of (3) is greater than the left hand side of (4), implying for any given c one or the other of these two equilibria exists. Both conditions are satis…ed simultaneously, indicating the existence of multiple equilibria, when
which is possible again by the fact that
. Regarding when one of the equilibria is unique, the labeling condition (3) cannot be satis…ed for c su¢ ciently large and the non-labeling condition (4) cannot be satis…ed for c su¢ ciently small. We state these results as the following proposition where the proof veri…es the inequalities stated above. . Therefore meeting the standard is good news about Q and bad news about S, while failing to meet the standard is the opposite. We term the downward adjustment of the estimate of S due to a label the "Groucho e¤ect" -achieving the goal diminishes the goal itself. And we term the upward adjustment to the estimate of S due to lack of a label the "reverse Groucho e¤ect"-failing to meet the goal enhances the goal itself. These adjustments lead to a moderating e¤ect on the estimates of Q where consumers are both less impressed by a label and less discouraged by lack of a label.
This can be seen by comparison with Figure 1 (b) where F and G are still uniform and the realized value s of the standard is known to consumers. The updated quality estimates based on meeting the standard or not, E[QjQ s] = (1 + s)=2 and E[QjQ < s] = s=2, are given respectively by the upper and lower lines in the …gure. Integrating these estimates of Q over the di¤erent values of s we get the These are the average expected qualities for the certain standard case where s is known, and they are the expected qualities that would result for the uncertain standard case if the conditional distribution of S did not become less favorable when Q S and more favorable when Q < S. Comparing these expectations with those in Figure 1(a) , the example illustrates the general rule, veri…ed in the proof of the following proposition, that
so meeting the labeling standard is better news on average if the standard is known for sure than if it is uncertain, and not meeting it is worse news on average if the standard is known for sure than if it is uncertain. The relationship in (6) implies that condition (3) for a labeling equilibrium is more strict with an uncertain standard than it is on average for a certain standard, and that condition (4) for a non-labeling equilibrium is less strict with an uncertain standard than it is on average for a certain standard. Thus, the Groucho e¤ect makes the condition for the labeling equilibrium harder to meet, and the reverse Groucho e¤ect makes the condition for the non-labeling equilibrium easier to meet.
Proposition 3
The expected range of certi…cation costs supporting a labeling (non-labeling) equilibrium is smaller (larger) if the standard is uncertain rather than certain.
To gain further insight into these di¤erences, consider Figure 2 where G is uniform and F follows the Beta distribution B(q; a; b). For the …gure we restrict either a = 1 and b 1, or a 1 and b = 1, 
based on averaging out the exact values for di¤erent realizations of S = s. The …gures illustrate the result from Proposition 2 that uncertainty over the standard makes label adoption less likely in that, relative to the case of certain standards, the equilibrium range for the labeling equilibrium is always smaller and the equilibrium range for the non-labeling equilibrium is always larger.
Consider the e¤ect of prior expectations about …rm quality on labeling incentives. The Groucho e¤ect is strongest for …rms with bad reputations because consumers are suspicious of any standard that such a …rm can meet, and similarly the reverse Groucho e¤ect is strongest for …rms with good reputations since consumers infer that failure to obtain a label implies that the standard for the label was very di¢ cult. Therefore the incentive to obtain a label is undermined the most for both good and bad reputation …rms. Since the Groucho and reverse Groucho e¤ects are weakest for intermediate …rms whose quality is most uncertain, the impact of certi…cation on expected quality is the strongest, and such …rms have the most incentive to obtain a label. 15 This is seen in Figure   2 (a) where the labeling region is at a minimum and the non-labeling region is at a maximum for E[Q] approaching 0 or 1. When standards are certain there is no joint updating about both quality and standards so bad reputation …rms who are actually of high quality can e¤ectively certify their quality, and good reputation …rms who fail to certify their quality when expected to can be heavily penalized by consumers. Therefore, as seen in Figure 2 (d) the labeling equilibrium region is comparably large for all …rms. The non-labeling region is smallest for bad reputation …rms because they have a strong incentive to certify their quality even when not expected to, while good reputation …rms can rely on their good reputations and save the certi…cation costs.
These results on the role of prior expectations imply that …rms with bad reputations for environmental quality that can in fact meet relatively stringent standards have the most to gain from more transparent labeling standards. As will be seen in the following section, and as illustrated in the remaining panels of Figure 2 , the divergence in labeling incentives between the certain and uncertain cases, and the di¤erential e¤ect on incentives based on prior expectations, becomes increasingly stark as the number of standards increases.
Multiple Labels
We now consider how label confusion is a¤ected by the availability of multiple labels with di¤erent standards. As noted in the introduction, the proliferation of di¤erent labels for some products is quite extreme. For instance, the website ecolabelling.org lists over 30 di¤erent labels for forest products, over 40 di¤erent labels for textiles, and over 100 di¤erent labels for food products. It might seem that more options should o¤er …rms more ways to show o¤ their quality, so that label usage increases. But the proliferation of standards is often blamed for creating confusion among consumers that weakens the credibility of all labels and reduces label adoption (Fischer et al., 2005) . This suggests that an increase in labels can aggravate the underlying problem of uncertain standards.
To gain insight into how the proliferation of labels interacts with standard uncertainty, we now assume that there are n 1 labels with di¤erent standards drawn independently from the same distribution G with the same cost c. Following standard notation for order statistics we denote the random variable representing the ith lowest realized standard by S i:n and its distribution by G i:n , so that G 1:n represents the distribution of the worst standard and G n:n represents the distribution of the best standard. The …rm's quality and the realized di¢ culties of the di¤erent standards are only known by the …rm, while F , G, c, and n are also known by consumers.
For simplicity we assume that if a …rm meets the standards for multiple di¤erent labels it can only adopt one of them. As long as attaining and displaying extra labels is costly, this assumption does not a¤ect our main qualitative results. 16 We also restrict attention initially to a "symmetric" labeling strategy where the …rm adopts the toughest label that it meets independent of any arbitrary properties of the ex ante identical standards. Any other equilibrium strategy that is similarly symmetric, such as always adopting the second toughest standard when possible, provides equivalent information about …rm quality to consumers. For now we do not consider "focal" equilibrium strategies where it is assumed that a particular label will always be adopted if the standard for it is met. Since consumers do not know which of the labels has a more di¢ cult standard, a label under a symmetric labeling strategy only proves that a …rm has met the easiest standard, even if the …rm has in fact met the best standard. Hence the incentives to obtain a label or not are exactly the same as in the previous section, with the only exception that we replace the random variable S with the random variable S 1:n representing the weakest of the n standards. Therefore, following conditions (3) and (4), for uncertain standards a symmetric labeling equilibrium exists if and only if
and a non-labeling equilibrium exists if and only if
For certain standards the conditions are quite di¤erent because consumers know the di¢ culty of the standard that was met, and also know the di¢ culty of standards that were not met. We de…ne a labeling equilibrium for certain standards as an equilibrium in which any of the di¤erent labels are adopted. For instance, a …rm might …nd a label with a high standard worth the certi…cation cost, but not a label with a lower standard (e.g., Viscusi, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982) . A labeling equilibrium exists if and only if some …rm types …nd it more pro…table to pay the certi…cation cost and prove that they meet a particular standard (and none higher) than to be thought of as coming from the whole range below that standard, 17 i.e., if and only if
where we de…ne s n+1:n = 1. The condition for a non-labeling equilibrium is simpler since lack of a label always gives a payo¤ of E[Q], implying that the incentive to unexpectedly adopt a label is always highest for those meeting the highest standard. In particular, under our belief re…nement a non-labeling equilibrium exists if and only if
As shown in Figure 2 , these conditions imply that behavior with uncertain standards diverges dramatically from that with certain standards. As the number of labels n increases consumers become increasingly suspicious of the value of a label and the expected quality conditional on having a label E[QjQ S 1:n ] falls. Therefore, comparing panel (a) with panels (b) and (c), as n increases the non-labeling equilibrium region based on equation (8) expands. In the limit condition (8) converges
c so a non-labeling equilibrium always exists for c > 0, which is particularly damaging to bad reputation …rms who lose the opportunity to disprove consumer expectations. Regarding the labeling equilibrium, if consumers expect a …rm to obtain a label and the …rm does not, then the expected quality conditional on not having any label E[QjQ < S 1:n ] also falls as the number of labels increases. Since both E[QjQ S 1:n ] and E[QjQ < S 1:n ] are decreasing in n, the labeling equilibrium region based on (7) can expand or contract, and as seen in the …gure in this example the region expands. In the limit condition (7) converges to E[Q] 0 c, so a labeling equilibrium only exists if …rm reputations are su¢ ciently good. 18 This labeling equilibrium provides almost no information on …rms, but good reputation …rms still feel compelled to obtain a label to avoid being thought of as very low quality. In contrast, comparing panel (d) with panels (e) and (f), for certain standards as n increases the labeling incentive for bad reputation …rms becomes increasingly strong, while the labeling incentive for good reputation …rms disappears.
The following proposition shows that these patterns hold generally for uncertain standards and, following Lizzeri (1999, Theorem 1), hold for certain standards as long as the distribution of F is log-concave. 19 Proposition 4 Suppose there are n labels with i.i.d. standards. If standards are uncertain, (i) the support of a non-labeling equilibrium is increasing in n, and, in the limit as n increases: (ii) non-labeling is an equilibrium for all c > 0, (iii) symmetric labeling is an equilibrium if and only if E[Q] c, and (iv) the symmetric labeling equilibrium is uninformative. If standards are certain, in the limit as n increases: (v) non-labeling is almost surely an equilibrium if and only if E[Q] 1 c, and (vi) for F log-concave, labeling is almost surely an equilibrium if and only if E[Q] 1 c. 1 8 Note that at E[Q] = 1 the …rm's quality is perfectly revealed and the incentive to label disappears, but our analysis assumes Q has full support on [0; 1] so the analytic results and the …gure are for the range E[Q] 2 (0; 1). 1 9 As a step in a more general analysis, Lizzeri (1999) analyzes the case where certi…cation costs are given and each quality level can be certi…ed. In our case in the limit as the number of labels increases there is essentially a di¤erent label for every quality level, so the problem converges to that analyzed by Lizzeri. Note that logconcavity is equivalent to a decreasing reverse hazard rate and is satis…ed by most commonly used distributions including the Normal, Uniform and Beta distribution (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005) .
Recall that Proposition 1 showed that certi…cation is always less informative when standards are uncertain. Proposition 4(iv) shows that for large n this result is even stronger in that, even though labeling can still be an equilibrium for large n, the informativeness of a label when standards are uncertain goes to zero, i.e., estimates of Q are no better than the prior estimates without a label. Managers …nd themselves in a labeling paradox. Labeling is completely wasteful since in equilibrium the …rm proves that it is not of the lowest type, but the …rm does not bene…t relative to prior expectations and consumers do not learn any information since the …rm being of the lowest type is a zero probability event anyway. This contrasts with the result for certain standards where as n increases a label becomes highly informative and the only residual uncertainty arises from …rms who do not have a label because of the certi…cation costs. This suggests that as the number of labeling organizations expands organizations interested in promoting eco-labels should try to limit the number of labels or better educate consumers about label standards.
That labeling provides no new information as n increases is related to the …nding by Lizzeri (1999) that a certi…cation intermediary who is interested in maximizing pro…ts from certi…cation will often choose the lowest possible standard with the result that there is no net gain in information to consumers. Since a …rm that does not meet the standard will be thought of as extremely low quality, …rms are willing to pay a high cost for the certi…cate, and since the certi…cate is so easy, almost all of them are able to pay for the certi…cate and receive it. Therefore a pro…t-maximizing certi…cation intermediary uninterested in informing consumers bene…ts the most from a low standard. Our model di¤ers in the assumption that there are multiple exogenous labeling standards rather than an endogenous standard chosen by a pro…t-maximizing certi…cation intermediary, and that there is a …xed cost to certi…cation rather than a pro…t-maximizing price set by the intermediary. Nevertheless we …nd the same result that as the number of labels grows consumers learn little from certi…cation even as …rms feel forced to expend substantial resources on it.
With multiple standards one standard is sometimes "focal"or "salient"in that consumers expect …rms to adopt the standard if they are able to, even if they also meet another potentially more demanding standard. For instance, in many European countries regional or national eco-labels appear to be focal relative to the E.U. Flower Label, e.g., the Nordic Swan label and German Blue Angel labels are more widely adopted for almost all product categories. Given the focality of these labels and that consumers do not know which labeling standards are tougher, consumers might infer that a …rm which displayed the E.U. Flower label was only able to attain it and not the focal label.
It might seem that information ‡ows will decrease if …rms are expected to choose a focal standard rather than the one they know to be toughest. To see how a focal standard can increase rather than decrease information ‡ows, we now consider "focal labeling strategies"based on arbitrary properties of the labels that are unrelated to their di¢ culty. In such a strategy there is one label, say label X, that a …rm is expected to adopt if it can. If the …rm adopts another label, say label Y , then it is assumed that it could not meet label X and that label Y was the best of the other labels it did meet. For certain standards, a …rm will clearly certify whichever label is toughest so any equilibrium based on focal strategies will break down. But for uncertain standards, consumers do not know which label is tougher so such a focal labeling equilibrium is possible. Such an equilibrium is more informative than a symmetric labeling equilibrium as the following proposition shows. 20 Proposition 5 Suppose there are n labels with i.i.d. standards. (i) If standards are uncertain and c is su¢ ciently low there exists a focal labeling equilibrium that is more informative than the symmetric labeling equilibrium. ii) If standards are certain a focal labeling equilibrium cannot exist.
The focality of a standard eliminates the problems caused by multiplicity of voluntary standards. The result is then similar to the n = 1 case in that there is no degradation of the expected di¢ culty of the standard, but it is actually better since …rms who do not meet the focal standard can still provide information to consumers by meeting a di¤erent standard. As discussed in the introduction, this result provides a role for industry groups, governments, and NGOs in not just setting and clarifying standards, but in attempting to make particular standards focal. "Look for the label" campaigns can help induce an equilibrium where consumers expect a particular standard to be used, and look less favorably on adoption of other labels. The key is not necessarily that the focal label has a higher standard, or that the standard be certain, but simply that there is a single standard which consumers expect …rms to try to attain.
This result has important implications for the debate over the role of industry-sponsored labels aimed at environmental and or social aspects of product quality. It is common for NGOs to criticize the introduction of industry-sponsored labels, often citing them as embodying lower quality standards than existing NGO labels. However, if the industry labels are introduced as a response to label proliferation, and if the industry succeeds in making its label focal, then there can be a gain in information to consumers. Therefore it might be strategic for NGOs to settle for less demanding labels that have a greater chance of becoming focal.
Our result on focal certi…cation equilibria is closely related to a …nding by Fishman and Hagerty (1990) who analyze a persuasion game with costless disclosure where there are multiple noisy signals about whether an investment project is pro…table or not, and assume that a …rm can only reveal one of them. Similar to our result they …nd that a "lexicographic" equilibrium is most informative in which a …rm releases the …rst signal that is favorable in accordance with a set order that is anticipated by receivers, so that releasing another favorable signal is therefore evidence that the …rst signal was not favorable. 21 An alternative to the use of campaigns to establish focal standards is to simply make it mandatory for a …rm to disclose whether it meets a particular standard. In this case bad news regarding this 2 0 The following proposition looks at the case where costs are su¢ ciently low that a …rm will adopt another label if it cannot meet the standard for the focal label. It can also be an equilibrium for a …rm to adopt the focal label if it can and otherwise not adopt any label. For su¢ ciently many standards such a strategy is also more informative than the symmetric disclosure equilibrium, but for low costs the …rm has an incentive to deviate to the equilibrium strategy we examine. Note also that in a focal equilibrium fewer …rms pay the certi…cation cost than in a symmetric equilibrium. 2 1 For more than two signals the lexicographic equilibrium they consider di¤ers from our focal equilibrium because there is a backup second "focal"label, then a third, etc. Because our setup is complicated by allowing for a continuum of …rm types and labeling standards, and because such a full degree of coordination appears unlikely for product labels, we do not evaluate such a lexicographic strategy.
mandatory disclosure on one standard can still be supplemented with good news on other standards, so the result is essentially the same as in the focal equilibrium if the certi…cation costs for the mandatory standards are taken as sunk costs. Therefore the informativeness result of Proposition 5 also provides an argument for mandatory certi…cation of a particular label, even if consumers do not know the exact standard for the label, and suggests that …rms may bene…t from partnering with government or dominant NGOs to promote a speci…c label as a marketing strategy.
Multiple Firms
We now consider how the presence of multiple …rms a¤ects label confusion. It might seem that, by observing which …rms obtain which labels, consumers should be able to learn about di¤erent labeling standards, and thereby reduce the information problems analyzed above. Indeed, if there is only one label and all …rms that can meet the label standard adopt it, then as the number of …rms increases, the fraction of the …rms obtaining the label is an increasingly precise estimate of the label standard. However, we …nd that two factors limit such learning. First, the non-labeling equilibrium is una¤ected by an increase in the number of …rms, so the potential for no learning, and also the potential for strategic uncertainty about how to interpret lack of a label, remains. Second, in the realistic case where there are both multiple …rms and also multiple labels, we …nd that …rms have an incentive to choose standards strategically in a way that interferes with consumer learning. First consider the simpler case where m …rms with i.i.d. qualities Q 1 ; :::; Q m simultaneously choose whether to adopt a single label with standard S. Assume that …rms know the realized values of their own and each other's qualities q 1 ; :::; q m and the realized di¢ culty of the standard s, but that consumers only know F , G, c, and m. The …rst part of the following proposition uses a standard Law of Large Numbers result to con…rm that the fraction of …rms obtaining the label can be an asymptotically precise estimate of the standard, so the situation for each …rm is equivalent to that of a single …rm facing a certain standard as examined in Section 2. The second part shows that this logic does not extend to the non-labeling equilibrium since the gain from deviating by a single …rm is E[Q i jQ i S] E[Q i ], so the condition for a nondisclosure equilibrium remains exactly the same as that of a single …rm facing an uncertain standard. The third part con…rms that for a certain standard the number of …rms has no e¤ect on the support of either equilibrium. Looking back at Figure 2 , this Proposition implies that the region where the labeling and nonlabeling equilibria coexist expands from the "L,N" areas in the separate panels of (a) and (d) to encompass the area above c in panel (a) and underneath E[c] in panel (d). Therefore even though the presence of multiple …rms can potentially reduce uncertainty over the standard by the …rst part of the proposition, it need not do so by the second part of the proposition, and the combination of these results implies that there is increased strategic uncertainty due to the larger range of c that supports multiple equilibria. 22 Therefore this result reinforces the argument that …rms and organizations interested in promoting eco-label adoption need to consider how to promote eco-labels in an environment where both labeling and non-labeling are equilibria. Similarly it also supports a role for mandatory labeling to avoid the multiple equilibrium problem. Now considering the case where there are both multiple …rms and multiple labels, learning about label standards is made more di¢ cult because adoption of one label by a …rm creates an information externality or spillover that can a¤ect the incentives for other …rms to certify. If a …rm follows the strategy of adopting the toughest label that it meets, and if the …rm is a good reputation …rm, then adoption of a label might be good news about the label standard which counteracts the Groucho e¤ect. Because of this selection e¤ect a good reputation …rm can "legitimize" a standard and make it more attractive to other …rms, while because of the Groucho e¤ect a bad reputation …rm can "spoil" a standard and make it less attractive to other …rms. Firms therefore have an incentive to choose standards strategically in a way that interferes with consumer learning.
To gain insight into this incentive, …rst suppose there are two labels with i.i.d. standards and two i.i.d. …rms. If one …rm follows the strategy of adopting the toughest label it meets and the prior F is very favorable, then the label which it adopts is likely to be the better one. This gives the other …rm an incentive to adopt the same label, regardless of whether the label is really the toughest. Conversely, if the prior F is very unfavorable, then the label which is adopted is still likely to be the worse one. This gives the other …rm an incentive to adopt the opposite label, regardless of whether it is really the toughest. Therefore in both cases …rms have an incentive to deviate from the symmetric certi…cation strategy of adopting the label with the toughest standard. 23 This is seen in Figure 3 (a) for two …rms with i.i.d. quality given by the Beta distribution as before and for two standards with i.i.d. uniform distribution. De…ne E[Q i jSame] as the expected quality of …rm i's product when the toughest standard that each …rm meets is the same,
and E[Q i jDi¤erent] as the expected quality of …rm i's product when one …rm meets a higher standard,
2 2 This is seen for the E.U. Flower Label which has di¤erent standards for di¤erent product categories, and where label adoption rates for the categories vary greatly. For instance, consumers could interpret the absence of adoption by any major laundry detergent products either as re ‡ecting a non-labeling equilibrium or as strong evidence that the labeling standard for detergents is very strict. In this case the former interpretation appears to be correct (Rubik and Frankl, 2005) . 2 3 Jovanovic (1982) notes in passing that the disclosure incentives of one …rm can be a¤ected by those of another if …rm quality is correlated. Here …rm quality is independent but conditional correlation is generated by the same uncertain standards being available to each …rm.
Because the …rms are i.
, so if (11)>(12) both …rms will prefer to adopt the same standard even if one meets a higher standard, and if (11)<(12) both …rms will prefer to adopt a di¤erent standard even if they both meet the higher standard, so a pure strategy equilibrium cannot exist. Only in the knife-edge case where (11)=(12) and the …rms are just indi¤erent is it an equilibrium for …rms to always follow the symmetric labeling strategy. This is seen in the …gure where, unless E[Q i ] = 1=2, …rms have an incentive to either pool with each other or separate from each other by choosing standards strategically. Such strategic behavior aggravates label confusion and makes it more di¢ cult for a …rm with a bad reputation to prove itself to be good. Now consider more generally m …rms with i.i.d. qualities choosing simultaneously whether to adopt one of n labels with i.i.d. standards where again the realized qualities and standards are known by the …rms but only F , G, c, m, and n are known to consumers. Let a = (a 1 ; :::; a m ) where a j equals the label 1 to n adopted by …rm j with 0 representing no label. Then in a candidate symmetric labeling equilibrium E[Q i ja] is expected quality conditional on the observed a and on the equilibrium strategy of adopting the toughest label attainable. If E[Q i ja] is constant for all a that are attainable for a given realization of (Q 1 ; :::; Q m ) then no …rm has an incentive to deviate. But if this knife-edge condition does not hold then, as in the two-…rm and two-label example above, at least one …rm has an incentive to deviate by adopting a lower standard.
This problem does not arise for a focal equilibrium. Suppose that there is a particular label that each …rm is expected to adopt or not if it meets the standard for it. Then the incentive to adopt the label is exactly the same as if there was only one label, 24 including the result from Proposition 6 that with many …rms consumers will become increasingly certain of the standard for the focal label. Therefore the focal equilibrium can approximate the case of a mandatory label, allowing consumers to learn about the meaning of the standard for the label from their experiences with di¤erent products. Again this result supports a role for marketing e¤orts aimed at the development or adoption of a focal labeling standard. The proof of the following proposition follows directly from the above arguments. This incentive to choose standards strategically can be aggravated if consumers have di¤erent priors about the di¤erent …rms's products. Figure 3(b) shows the case where "good reputation"…rm 1 has convex Beta distribution parameterized by ( ; 1) and "bad reputation"…rm 2 has the symmetric concave independent Beta distribution parameterized by
. 2 4 If …rms that do not meet the standard for the focal label adopt another label then this is good news that the …rm at least meets the easiest standard. Which of the other labels …rms choose depends on the same coordination issues regarding the symmetric labeling equilibrium, so generically there will be a mixed strategy equilibrium for the other labels, but this does not a¤ect the incentive to adopt the focal label. there is no incentive to be strategic, but as soon as a gap emerges the good reputation …rm always wants to choose a di¤erent label than the bad reputation …rm, and the bad reputation …rm always wants to choose the same label as the good reputation …rm. If both …rms adopt the same label, it is likely that only the weaker standard was met, which is bad news for the good reputation …rm and good news or the bad reputation …rm. If both …rms adopt di¤erent labels, it is likely that the good reputation …rm met the tougher standard and the bad reputation …rm met the weaker standard, so the good reputation …rm gains and the bad reputation …rm loses. Hence there cannot be an equilibrium in which each …rm always adopts the toughest label it meets. Instead, if both …rms meet both standards, there must be a mixed strategy equilibrium where the bad reputation …rm tries to choose the same label as the good reputation …rm while the good reputation …rm tries to avoid such an outcome. The above analysis assumes that the choice of standards is simultaneous, but the analysis can also be applied to the case of sequential adoption. In the sequential case, a "labeling cascade" can emerge in which …rms choose the same label strategically. For instance, in the two-…rm and two-label example in Figure 3(a) , if both …rms have good reputations so that E[Q i jSame] > E[Q i jDif f erent] then the second …rm raises its expected quality by herding with the …rst …rm and adopting the same label even if it meets an even tougher standard for another label. Similarly, if both …rms have good reputations so that E[Q i jSame] < E[Q i jDif f erent] then anti-herding can arise in which the second …rm chooses a di¤erent label than the …rst …rm. These e¤ects are ampli…ed if the …rms have di¤erent reputations as in the example in Figure 3(b) , in which case herding will arise if the good reputation …rm goes …rst and anti-herding will arise if the bad reputation …rm goes …rst. In each case, the uncertainty of standards creates interdependence in the perceived quality of products that leads to a strategic choice of labels. 25 As mentioned in the introduction, a common strategy when introducing a new eco-label is to try to induce the most reputable companies to adopt the label with the hope that other companies will then adopt it. Similar strategies occur in many other contexts, e.g., new journals try to start with articles by respected authors. The above analysis implies that information spillovers may be one reason for this strategy. If a good reputation …rm moves …rst then the bad reputation …rm can always choose the same label if it is capable of doing so. Therefore the good reputation …rm has no incentive to deliberately choose an easier label and, if it faces any uncertainty at all over whether the bad reputation …rm will meet the tougher label, it has a strict incentive to choose the tougher label. However, since there is a second-mover advantage, a good …rm needs to be given some incentive to move …rst.
We have assumed that …rms do not care directly how other …rms are regarded by consumers, but only care if the label itself is diminished or enhanced due to the actions of other …rms. In many situations …rms will be in the same industry and therefore have a competitive incentive to look good relative to other …rms by undermining their competitors' perceived quality. 26 The above analysis shows that, even without such product market externalities, …rms need to worry about the strategic e¤ects of labeling decisions.
Conclusion
The literature on eco-labels and other quality certi…cation schemes has long recognized that consumer confusion is a major hurdle to their adoption and e¤ective use. Our analysis provides a theoretical basis for such concerns when consumers have even slight uncertainty about the di¢ culty of labeling standards. Since consumers must jointly update the estimated quality of the product and the estimated di¢ culty of the standard, there are not only direct information losses but also substantial indirect losses as …rms decide whether it is worthwhile to be certi…ed and, if so, which of multiple labels to adopt. We …nd that a "Groucho e¤ect" due to uncertainty discourages labeling when it is most bene…cial to consumers and …rms, that the e¤ects of uncertainty are aggravated by the proliferation of labels with di¤erent standards, that strategic uncertainty due to multiple equilibria becomes particularly problematic as the number of labels increases, and that information spillovers give …rms an incentive to choose strategically among di¤erent labels so as to make learning about labeling standards more di¢ cult for consumers.
Mandatory adoption of eco-labels can also su¤er from direct information losses due to uncertainty over certi…cation standards, but precludes the additional indirect losses due to …rm labeling decisions, and can also facilitate consumer learning about standards. Therefore these results provide an additional consideration in the debate over voluntary versus mandatory disclosure of product quality. We …nd that actions aimed at making one standard "focal" can also reduce the indirect information losses. "Look for the label" promotional campaigns that induce consumers and …rms to focus on a particular label, even if the standard for it remains uncertain, can increase certi…ca-tion incentives, reduce the problem of strategic uncertainty due to multiple equilibria, and improve consumer learning by eliminating …rm incentives to choose among labels strategically.
Our results assume that consumers are unsure of both the absolute and relative di¢ culty of di¤erent standards, but sometimes the relative di¢ culty of di¤erent standards is known even when the exact standards are not. For instance, consumers might know that one eco-label is an industry label while another is an NGO label, and infer that the latter represents a more di¢ cult standard. Clearly, such relative information can reduce some of the problems identi…ed in this paper. Therefore another strategy for organizations to reduce label confusion is to focus on providing a clear ranking of di¤erent labels, even if the exact standards remain di¢ cult to communicate to consumers. One option is for a single certi…er to provide multiple labels representing di¤erent ranked standards, e.g., gold, silver, and bronze labels for LEED certi…cation of buildings. However, as discussed in the introduction, the vast majority of eco-labels take the simple pass-fail form analyzed in this paper, so better understanding of why certi…ers do not provide richer information to consumers is an important area of future research. 
and the expected MSE for the certain case is
Comparing, (13)- (14) equals 
and, from (2), for the non-labeling equilibrium we need to show that
Considering the non-labeling equilibrium …rst, (18) is equivalent to
The RHS is an increasing function of s and the inequality holds weakly for s = 1 so the inequality holds for all s. Now considering the labeling equilibrium, given that (18) holds, (17) holds if
which always holds by the same arguments as above. Proof of Proposition 4: (i) We …rst want to show that G 1:n M LR G 1:n+1 , i.e., the distribution of the worst of n standards MLR dominates the distribution of the worst of n + 1 standards. Noting that
by the de…nition of MLR dominance we need to show that, for all x < y,
(n + 1)(1 G(y)) n g(y) ; which simpli…es to G(x) G(y) which holds for all x < y. Now we want to show that if G M LR H for any two distributions G and H then it is better good news when the …rm bears a standard with distribution G than H. So we need to prove that
which can be rewritten as
De…ne the densities p(s)
(1 F (t))h(t)dt and let P (s) and Q(s) represent the respective distributions. Since E[qjq s] is increasing in s, the above condition holds if P F OSD Q. By the assumption that G M LR H, for all x < y,
so P reverse hazard rate dominates Q which implies P F OSD Q and hence (23) holds. Letting G = G 1:N and H = G 1:n+1 this establishes that E[QjQ > S 1:n ] E[QjQ > S 1:n+1 ]. Therefore, from (8) , the support of a non-labeling equilibrium is increasing in n.
(ii) By the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the empirical distribution G n (s) of n standards converges uniformly to the theoretical distribution G as n goes to in…nity, implying that for any " > 0 the minimum of these standards is almost surely less than " in the limit. Hence the expected quality from unexpected labeling converges to E[Q] in the limit, and the necessary and su¢ cient condition (8) for a non-labeling equilibrium reduces to E[Q] E[Q] c or c 0.
(iii) By the same argument as in (ii), the expected quality from non-labeling converges to 0 and from labeling converges to E[Q] in the limit as n increases, so the necessary and su¢ cient condition (7) for a symmetric labeling equilibrium reduces to E[Q] 0 c.
(iv) By the same argument as in (ii), in the limit as n increases a …rm meets the worst of the n standards almost surely and expected quality conditional on meeting the standard equals E[Q], so the expected MSE in the labeling equilibrium just equals the variance of F .
(v) For any …rm of type q, consider the largest realized standard s such that q s and the smallest realized standard s such that s q. Given s and s, in a non-labeling equilibrium if the …rm certi…es then it has expected quality E[Qjs Q < s] and if it does not certify then it still has expected quality E[Q], so non-labeling is an equilibrium if and only if E[Qjs Q < s] E[Q] c. By the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the empirical distribution G n (s) of n standards converges uniformly to the theoretical distribution G as n goes to in…nity, so for any " > 0, for any q, maxfq s; s qg < " for su¢ ciently large n. 
The latter condition is clearly binding and holds for su¢ ciently low c. In such an equilibrium consumers learn that the …rm did not meet even the lowest standard, Q < S 1:n , or that the …rm met the lowest standard but not the focal standard, S 1:n Q < S, or that the …rm met the focal standard, Q S. In a symmetric labeling equilibrium they learn only that the …rm met or did not meet the lowest standard, Q < S 1:n or Q S 1:n . The former partition is …ner so it reveals more information.
(ii) Suppose the …rm is following a focal certi…cation strategy of always adopting a standard X even if standard Y is tougher. Since consumers know which standard is tougher, this is only possible if consumer beliefs "punish" the …rm for choosing Y out of equilibrium. But under our belief re…nement, we assume that any type is equally likely to have deviated, so the expected quality of adopting Y is higher and the proposed strategy is not an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6: (i) Suppose each …rm follows the labeling equilibrium strategy of certifying when it meets the standard. Then the conditional density of S given that k of m …rms 
For any m, it is straightforward to show that the MLE estimate of s is s 0 . We want to show that this estimate is asymptotically precise in that (1 F (s)) (1 F (s 0 ))
Taking the log of the base and di¤erentiating with respect to s, the base reaches a unique maximum of 1 at s = s 0 . Therefore for any s 6 = s 0 , the base is less than 1, implying the whole term goes to 0 as m ! 1. This con…rms that, in the limit for large m, for each realization of s from the distribution G consumers infer s exactly. The condition for each …rm to follow the proposed strategy is then E[Q i jQ i > s] E[Q i jQ i < s] c, implying that the expected support for the equilibrium over the distribution of possible standards is c < E[c] where
which is the same as that for a single …rm facing a certain standard.
(ii) Suppose each …rm follows a strategy of not labeling. The expected payo¤ for a single …rm is just E[Q i ]. If a single …rm deviates, then as discussed our belief re…nement is that the label is treated as good news that concentrates the posterior distribution of Q i on [s; 1] where s is distributed according to G. Therefore the payo¤ to a single …rm from deviating is E[Q i jQ i > S] c, so the equilibrium condition for non-labeling is
which is the same as that for a single …rm facing an uncertain standard.
(iii) If the standard is certain then consumers by de…nition learn nothing about the distribution of standards from which …rms adopt which labels. Hence the equilibrium conditions are the same as if there is only one …rm.
